The Longmont Leader received a letter to the editor from David Stephen concerning human consciousness, AI, and animal welfare.
Announcing a Philosophy for Lunch event, held on February 27, to discuss “The Hard Problem of Consciousness," the Department of Philosophy at Montclair State University wrote, “Pinch your arm (gently). When you do this, various signals are sent to your brain, causing it to enter into a certain electrochemical state. The result: an experience of pain. But why exactly? Why does a brain in this electrochemical state give rise to an experience of pain — an experience that feels like this? Why doesn’t it give rise to an experience of pleasure or some other experience? And, moreover, why does it give rise to some experience as opposed to no experience at all? This is the hard problem of consciousness. In this P4L, we’ll try to get clear on what this problem is and what it means for consciousness in a physical world.”
The objective to understand consciousness is not limited to feelings. All functional processes in the brain are electrochemical, which includes language. This means that a word or letter is processed electrochemically, differently from another word or letter. So, consciousness is also about the experience of a memory, not just of a feeling.
Electrochemical in the brain means the electrical and chemical signals of neurons. The reason, conceptually, that there is an experience of pain after a pinch is because there is a configuration [or formation] of a set of electrical and chemical signals that specify what that particular experience is, differently from some other experience, say pleasure, or another kind of pain. Simply, electrical and chemical signals operate in loops or sets [in clusters of neurons]. It is within these sets that they hold specific assemblages for what makes a function become an experience, and to what extent it is experienced — in that instance.
Why is this plausible? All functional processes in the brain involve electrical and chemical signals. They are the only candidates for the kinds of flexibility necessary to define functions and to grade them. Simply, neurons cannot specify an experience differently from another because neurons are cells, with nearly fixed anatomy, such that they cannot have changes from one form to another to specify a function. Also, genes are not the candidates, as their expression does not, for example, store a language or store tastes in meals and so forth. Genes are not the human mind. Neurons are not the human mind. Microtubules, or Glia are not the human mind. Electrical and chemical signals in sets can define functions and their attributes [or measures]. To rule out electrical and chemical signals for the mind and consciousness would be to identify [and justify] something else within the cranium, for those.
Functions are obtained by the interaction of electrical and chemical signals. This means that in a set, electrical signals have to strike at chemical signals—in interaction—to access the configuration in that set. This is what primarily gives rise to functions. Attributes are the states, of the sets of signals, respectively, at the time of the interaction, becoming the extents to which the signals interact: volume of chemical signals, intensity of strike of electrical signals, side-to-side volume variation of chemical signals, splits of electrical signals, in sets, departure points of electrical signals within the set [as sequences, old/new], distributions of electrical signals [as broad relays] and others are states [of signals, as attributes] that define the extents [measures or grades] of interactions at any moment.
This postulation can also be used to explain mental disorders. It breaks from the theory of action potentials triggering neurotransmitter release. It instead says that in a set of signals—within a cluster of neurons — not just in one synapse, chemical signals are almost ready, but it is when electrical signals strike them that they can give the formation they hold. A set of signals for functions breaks also from the generalizations of one neurotransmitter for pleasure or another for learning, but to the formation and attributes of that set. [Neuroscience has established that: Electrical signals are ions, with action potential as voltage changes along the neural membrane. Chemical signals are molecules, encompassing neurotransmitters, neuromodulators, neuropeptides and others.]
Functions can be categorized as memory, feelings, emotions, and regulation of internal senses. Subdivisions include [language, intelligence, thoughts] for memory, [pain, thirst, appetite] for feeling, [happiness, hurt] for emotions, and [control of digestion, respiration and others] for regulation of internal senses. Attributes that grade these functions include attention for the most prioritized set of signals in an instance, awareness for less than attention, subjectivity for the self, and intent or control.
These [functions and attributes] are description of what corresponds to electrical and chemical signals interacting and their states to result in those. Simply, all labels for what the mind is said to do are interactions and states of electrical and chemical signals. This means that to explore consciousness elsewhere, even if the same mechanism is not present, whatever corresponds to those descriptions can be observed. Consciousness is not just subjective experience because for any experience [a memory, a feeling or an emotion] to be subjective, it has to be in attention or at least in awareness. This means that it has to be prioritized or pre-prioritized, as a set of signals. Pain, for example, has to be in attention or awareness, while subjective.
Why is there an experience at all, as opposed to nothing? This is because the external world is an information and signals have the capacity to turn several into experiences—with their interactions and attributes, making something possible and not nothing. For example, when the sight of something is clear, its interpretation, as a formation, is different from when the sight of the thing is not clear. Showing that external information makes it into the mind and then the mind's interaction and attributes does not just interpret but specifies the interpretation.
Also, what it feels like to be something is because of the self, a volume variation of chemicals signals in a set, from side-to-side, conceptually, for the set that has the most volume in a moment or the one with a higher intensity of strikes by electrical signals or the set with a sudden change in volume, possibly by one of the chemical signals, say [excitatory] glutamate. Animals with electrical and chemical signals can also be compared — to certain functions and attributes of the human mind — to inform aspects of welfare.
There is a recent perspective in Science, Evaluating animal consciousness, stating that “For instance, linguistic behavior is a marker of specific kinds of conscious thought and emotion in humans. But as demonstrated by large language models that simulate human conversation, linguistic behavior alone is not strong evidence of consciousness in nonhuman systems. Awake, adult humans display many interconnected behavioral and neurobiological markers of conscious thought and emotion. When humans face danger, they do not merely report “Danger!” but they may freeze and tense their muscles, and they may demonstrate increased heart rate and respiration, as both the brain’s amygdala and cerebral cortex regions increase activity. When a system only demonstrates one type of marker, such as verbal behavior, it provides at best very weak evidence of consciousness. But when many types of markers are present together, they can jointly provide strong evidence. When some markers of consciousness are present and others are absent, careful interpretation is required. For example, when behavioral markers of consciousness are absent in humans — as with fetuses, infants, and humans who are unresponsive after brain injuries — researchers can give more weight to neurophysiological markers, such as the perturbational complexity index and the P3b wave (both of which measure responses to specific kinds of external stimuli). Alternatively, when human neurophysiological markers are absent — as with animals that have very different brain structures, such as octopuses or bees — behavioral markers become more important.”
Consciousness is a combination of attributes and functions, corresponding to those of humans [on average], even if the similar mechanism is present or not. The focus on feeling for consciousness is limited, when language can also be used, since AI now has language. Human consciousness can be defined, conceptually, as the interaction of the electrical and chemical signals, in sets — in clusters of neurons — with their features, grading those interactions into functions and experiences. The total consciousness per instance can be assumed to be 1, for all the interactions and attributes. This means that since language is a part of memory, which is a part of what can be conscious, language has a measure. This measure can be used to explore how AI might be having a fraction of a function — and attributes.
